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Monetary Policy in the Euro Area -
Lessons from the First Years
Abstract
This paper investigates in a consistent semi-structural empirical framework three current
issues of monetary policy in the euro area. First, regarding policy transmission we offer a
three-stage procedure to combine the efficient estimation of economic structure prior to EMU
with current ECB monetary policy. Second, we test whether the regime change leads – before
or after – EMU to structural instability. Third, we investigate the stance of monetary policy in
Europe. We compare a “counterfactual” ECB reaction function based on average interest rates
prior to EMU with actual ECB policy. Furthermore, we compare actual ECB policy with
interest rate projections using Bundesbank reaction functions and euroland data.
JEL-classification: E52, F41
Keywords: European Monetary Union, Monetary policy, Semi-structural modelling, Reaction
function, Taylor rule, Transmission mechanism2
1. Introduction
Since the start of European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, three areas of empirical research
in monetary economics increasingly attract interest: The most active line focuses on the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the euro area because the effective conduct of
European Central Bank (ECB) policy requires reliable information on the strength and the
timing of the aggregate effects of monetary policy. Considerable attention is also paid to the
differences in monetary policy transmission across the EMU member countries. A recent
comprehensive survey is provided by Angeloni et al. (2002).
A second strand investigates whether the regime change in monetary policy caused a
structural break in the underlying macroeconomic relationships. Before the start of EMU,
some authors expected substantial changes (e.g. Arnold and De Vries, 2000). In this case, past
data and empirical analyses cease to contain useful information on economic behaviour in the
new monetary environment. This would seriously undermine the effective conduct of
monetary policy in Europe. As one of the first studies in this area, Mihov (2001) also includes
data after the establishment of EMU. Based on the accuracy of out-of sample forecasts for
output and inflation in the euro area, he did not detect significant deviations and concludes
that empirical research based on pre-EMU data continues to be relevant after the
establishment of EMU.
A third upcoming line investigates the overall stance of ECB policy. In particular, how actual
ECB policy relates to the previous behaviour of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
1 Drawing on
Clarida et al. (1998), Alesina et al. (2001) and Faust et al. (2001) apply an estimated reaction
function of the Bundesbank to euroland data and compare the implied interest rate projections
with actual ECB policy rates. Taking this benchmark, they find ECB rates to be consistently
below those values that would have been chosen by the Bundesbank. Mihov (2001) finds that
ECB behaviour resembles more an aggregate behaviour of the central banks in Germany,
France and Italy than of the Bundesbank alone.
2
This paper develops an empirical approach that is able to address in a consistent framework
all three research strands simultaneously. We adopt a semi-structural modelling approach. It
attempts to exploit the advantages of both, VAR and more structural models, while trying to
                                               
1 Begg et al. (2002) compare the actual ECB policy with projections of Fed policy for the euro area. They apply
a Taylor rule, which explains US interest rates, to euroland data and find that the Fed would have responded to
the slowdown in Europe in 2001 in a similar quantitative dimension, but probably somewhat earlier.
2 Aksoy et al. (2002) take a related, but somewhat different perspective. They analyse to which extent ECB
interest rate setting based on euroland data differs from the interest rate setting being optimal only based on
German data.3
avoid the well-known disadvantages. VAR models tend to be over-parameterised, rarely allow
for informative cross-equation restrictions, and the test procedures tend to have low power.
Structural models, on the other hand, impose numerous restrictions such that they often fail to
capture the data generating process (DGP); in particular the underlying dynamics. Our
combination of these data-led and theory-led approaches imposes sufficient restrictions to
yield structurally meaningful equations, which are still admissible representations of the
underlying data generating process.
We propose a three-stage modelling procedure in order to capture the specific context of
EMU: In the first stage, we estimate in the period prior to EMU a system of nine equations.
For each of the three largest EMU countries we specify an inflation equation, an output gap
equation and a policy reaction function for interest rates. In the second stage, we hold the
macroeconomic structure estimated in the first step constant and only estimate a single policy
reaction function based on euro area aggregates. This allows us to model the changeover to
EMU on the policy side assuming the economic structure to remain invariant. In the third
stage, we study the impulse responses in the individual countries to a common interest rate
shock.
Our specific set-up combines the efficient estimation of the pre-EMU economic structure with
current ECB monetary policy making. Prior to EMU, the macroeconomic developments in the
individual countries were affected by the national developments of interest rates and by the
national effective exchange rates including the intra-European exchange rates. Therefore,
these data ought to be used for an efficient estimation of the macroeconomic structure. After
the establishment of EMU, however, we need to model introduction of a common monetary
policy and the loss of the exchange rate channel between EMU members. Our semi-structural
approach in conjunction with the three-stage modelling procedure exactly meets these
requirements.
Our approach contributes to all three research strands mentioned above: First, we combine the
pre-EMU economic structure with current ECB monetary policy making and analyse how
interest rate shocks are transmitted across different EMU members. Our impulse responses
illustrate the aggregate as well as the differential effects in euroland. Second, our econometric
design allows for statistical tests for structural instability before and after the establishment of
EMU. Our semi-structural approach enables us to exactly identify the equation(s) being
subject to structural change. Third, we analyse ECB behaviour by estimating a
“counterfactual” ECB reaction function based on past average interest rate data. We contrast
our estimates with actual ECB rates to investigate how well this equation fits the data.4
Furthermore, we compare ECB interest rates with interest rate projections based on euroland
data and Bundesbank reaction functions. Moving beyond previous studies in this research
area, we perform direct statistical tests of the significance of observed differences between
actual and projected interest rates.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric model. Section 3
analyses the counterfactual ECB reaction function based only on historical data prior to EMU.
Section 4 compares the behaviour of the ECB and the Bundesbank. Section 5 concludes.
2. Econometric model
This section briefly outlines the underlying semi-structural model (see Clausen and Hayo
2002 for more details). We estimate a nine equation simultaneous equation model using full-
information maximum likelihood techniques (FIML). The EMU in our model consists of
France, Germany, and Italy, which together account for about 75% of total output in EMU.
For each country, three equations are specified: an output gap, an inflation, and an interest
rate equation. We use quarterly data from 1979:1, the start of the European Monetary System
(EMS), to 2000:4, the most recent official data available to us. The data source are the IMF
International Financial Statistics, and the actual estimation period is 1979:1 to 1996:4. We
keep eight observations for out-of-sample tests before and after the establishment of EMU,
respectively.
According to standard diagnostic tests for serial correlation, non-normality, and parameter
stability, our model is an acceptable representation of the DGP.
3 In addition, we perform an
out-of-sample stability analysis. Again, we do not detect a problem with our specification (see
Appendix, Table A). The Appendix also provides the FIML results for the output gap and
inflation equations (Tables B and C). The labels F, G, and I represent France, Germany, and
Italy, respectively. The short-term interest rate is denoted by Int, the output gap by Gap, the
effective exchange rates by EMU and ROW, and the inflation rate by Infl. All variables are
quarter-to-quarter growth rates expressed in percent, except for the exchange rate, which is a
four-period moving average of its natural logarithm.
In the output gap equations, the interest rate variables are found to be significantly negative
but at different lags. The own lagged output gap is always significant. On the other hand, it is
                                               
3 The estimations and statistical tests were performed with PC FIML 9.0. See Doornik and Hendry (1997) for a
detailed description of the tests. We also computed robust standard errors (White 1980) to check for possible
problems with heteroscedasticity. The corresponding test results are similar except for one case mentioned later
in the text.5
hard to detect reliable international output spill-over effects. The same holds for the exchange
rate effects, which are typically significant but often display opposite signs at different lags.
Table C in the Appendix presents the estimates for the inflation equations. In all countries, the
output gap has a significant impact on inflation. In France, it is slightly above the 10%-
significance level but considerably lower when heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors
are used (p-value: 0.079). The inflation dynamics are fairly similar with significant and
similar coefficients occurring at the same lag length.
4
Table 1 presents the estimates of the interest rate reaction functions. We make the
conventional assumption that the inflation rate and the output gap enter the policy reaction
function. Note that we employ the current values of these variables, which makes the system a
true simultaneous equation model. Given the lags in statistical reporting, this amounts to a
forward looking procedure in practice. We also allow for interest rate smoothing up to lag
four. In a consistent testing-down process, we are able to reduce the number of lags to two.
Persistence in interest rates is considerable, with own lags having a coefficient of at least 0.84
(France: 0.84, Germany: 0.89, Italy: 0.87). The German interest rate equation contains a
constant term, which represents the “anchor” interest rate. In view of the interaction in the
EMS, we include the German interest rate as an “anchor” in the French and Italian reaction
functions. In the case of France, we find that the current German interest rate dominates the
inclusion of an additional constant term. In the case of Italy, however, this EMS connection is
weaker, which is consistent with economic experience. However, we keep this symmetric
specification for the sake of comparability.
Table 1: FIML-system: Interest rate reaction functions







































s 0.779 0.431 0.829
Notes: (*), *, ** indicate statistical significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
For France and Italy, we find that both, output gap and inflation, have a significant positive
impact on interest rates. In Germany, the output gap does not have a significant influence on
                                               
4 This conclusion is based here only on visual inspection. Clausen and Hayo (2002) perform a wide range of
statistical tests for asymmetric monetary policy transmission in the EMU across the national output gap and
inflation equations and across different time horizons.6
interest rates, while the coefficient on inflation is relatively large. Furthermore, a dummy
capturing reunification is also included and found to be significant. Dummy variables for the
other countries reflect the October 1981 realignment of the Franc and the EMS crisis in 1992.
Since these events turned out to be insignificant in the German reaction function, this can be
interpreted as further evidence of German dominance in the EMS (see, e.g., Wyplosz, 1989,
von Hagen and Fratianni, 1990). Statistical tests based on the short-run coefficients confirm
that Germany places the highest relative weight on inflation, followed by France and with
Italy at the end of the spectrum. The implied long-run reaction functions further illustrate this
result (Table 2). The Bundesbank reaction function places in comparison the greatest weight
on inflation, followed by the Bancque de France and the Banca d’Italia.
Table 2: Long-run reaction functions
Output gap Inflation rate Nominal “anchor”
France 1.73 2.28 3.26
Germany 0.49 2.89 4.02
Italy 2.46 2.02 0.48
We checked our system for structural instability in the run-up to EMU. Using the out-of-
sample observations from 1997:1 to 1998:4, Chow-tests do not indicate any instability. Thus,
in the two years preceding EMU, no significant changes in economic behaviour can be
observed.
3. A counterfactual ECB reaction function
Modelling EMU requires two modifications to the structure of our baseline model: First, the
intra-EMU exchange rate channel is removed. Therefore, we now keep the nominal intra-
EMU effective exchange rate at its value in 1998:4. Second, monetary policy decision-making
is transferred to the ECB. The national reaction functions and interest rates have to be
replaced by a common reaction function and a European interest rate. In general, this reaction
function may be assumed a priori or it can be estimated. In a first step, we estimate an EMU
reaction function based on past average interest rates while restricting the rest of the system to
the pre-EMU parameter estimates. Using this baseline model, we are then able to perform
policy analyses conditional on a constant structure of the three economies.
We define aggregate EMU variables for the interest rate, inflation and the output gap based on
weighted averages of national variables. The corresponding weights are the shares of national
GDP in the aggregate GDP of the three countries in our sample (France: 0.304, Germany:7
0.451, Italy: 0.245). Estimating a single reaction function for the average European interest
rate while keeping the parameters in the output gap and inflation equations fixed yields
(standard errors in brackets):
EUIntt = 1.08 EUIntt-1 – 0.22 EUIntt-2 + 0.57 + 0.31 EUInft + 0.31 EUGapt
  (0.07)     (0.07)     (0.18)   (0.11)    (0.06)
+ 1.69 D81:2 + 0.67 D91:1 + 2.73 D92:3  (1)
  (0.33) (0.33) (0.31)
The estimate for the interest rate smoothing parameter is 0.86, which is within the range of
estimates for the national reaction functions displayed in table 1. It is slightly lower than
estimates by Clarida et al. (1998), who generally find values above 0.90 for the Fed, the
Bundesbank, and the Bank of Japan. The policy weights on inflation and the output gap are
identical.
5 The dummies in 81:2, 91:1 and 92:3 are again related to realignments in the EMS
and to German reunification.
The restricted pre-EMU part of the model is now combined with the estimated ECB reaction
function to analyse the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area. The impulse
responses in figure 1 illustrate the dynamic effects of an interest rate hike by one percentage
point. As it is apparent from the first graph in the last row of figure 1, European interest rates
(EUInt) need about eight quarters to gradually return to their initial value. In response, all
three countries experience a decline in output and inflation (see first row of graphs in figure
1). The negative impact is strongest in Germany. It occurs after two quarters and vanishes
after 10 quarters. In Italy, the trough occurs after six quarters and the output gap returns to
normal after 12 quarters. In France, the minimum is found after seven quarters, while the
economy needs 22 quarters to return to the original equilibrium. Statistical tests show that the
reactions in Germany and Italy are indeed significantly stronger than in France (Clausen and
Hayo, 2002).
The reaction of inflation follows the development of the output gaps (see second row in figure
1). The fall in inflation is strongest in Germany, followed by Italy and France. Germany also
shows the earliest reaction, while the effect in France is weak, with its minimum occurring
after four years. Moreover, persistence is much lower in Germany than in the other countries.
                                               
5 This stands in contrast with most previous estimates of Taylor rules, see Clarida et al. (1998), Gerlach and
Schnabel (2000) and Faust et al. (2001. Typically, the weight on the output gap is found to be comparatively
smaller. This is generally explained by considerable uncertainty about the output gap.8
After 20 quarters, the pre-shock inflation rate is reached again. In the other countries, this
adjustment requires about 48 quarters.
Finally, the last two graphs in figure 1 display the development of the aggregate EMU values
resulting from the evolution of national values. The minimum output gap value occurs five
periods after the shock. In other words, the maximum negative impact of a tightening of
monetary policy takes place after less than one and a half years. European output needs less
than three years to get back to its starting value. The maximum deflationary effect of
monetary policy in the euro area can be observed six periods after the shock, thus lagging
about one quarter behind output. The development of European prices is much more
persistent, though.




































EUGAP (EUINT eqn) 
We check the stability of the system in order to detect potential structural changes in the run-
up to and after the start of EMU using 16 observations from 1997:1 to 2000:4. The
conventional Chow test (F(112,65) = 1.59*) as well as the Chow test taking parameter
uncertainty into account (F(112,65) = 1.50*) reject the null hypothesis of stability at a 5%
level. However, this system instability is not due to the interest rate equation. Comparing one-
step ahead forecasts with their 95%-confidence intervals and actual values of EMU interest9
rates indicates that the observations are well within the corridor of statistical uncertainty (see
figure 2).
Figure 2: Structural stability of “counterfactual” ECB reaction function







Start of EMU End of estimated sample
1-step Forecasts  EUINT 
Mihov (2001) describes a similarly close tracking of actual values by his estimates as
“remarkable”. However, it must be noted that the equation is primarily driven by the interest
smoothing parameter. Given the considerable persistence in interest rates, the actual influence
of output gap and inflation weights on the overall fit of the equation is rather small.
In our model, the source of system instability lies in the Italian output gap equation. Figure 3
shows that our equation consistently overestimates the extent of the output gap. This suggests
that the adjustment of the Italian economy during the early phase of EMU was associated with
considerable costs in terms of lost real output. In absolute terms and ignoring estimation
uncertainty, these costs amount to up to 2 percentage points of the output gap. Even more
troubling, these costs do not seem temporary and to be growing over time. Note, however,
that only the two observations in 2000:2 and 2000:4 actually fall outside the confidence
intervals and, therefore, the output loss might in fact be lower.
Figure 3: Italian output gap equation under the EMU reaction function






4 End of estimated sample Start of EMU
1-step Forecasts  IGAP 10
As indicated above, the focus on the actual interest rates versus the fitted values based on the
short-run reaction function may be misleading, because the large coefficients of the lagged
dependent variables are bound to generate a good fit of the series. Thus, in the following, we
compare the actual interest rate with the target interest rate based on the long-run equilibrium.
The static long-run is derived by replacing the lagged dependent variables and by setting the
dummies to zero:
EUInt = 3.91 + 2.15 EUInf + 2.12 EUGap (2)
Figure 4 compares the long-run target values with the average of the three interest rates over
the 1990s. From 1999 onwards, actual ECB rates are used.
Figure 4: Comparison of actual interest rates with long-run target values








End of estimated sample Start of EMU
EUINT  EUINT long-run target rate 
The long-run target rate is below the average interest rates from the early 80s to early 90s. At
the end of the period, however, long-run rates based on the estimated ECB reaction function
suggest that actual interest rates are too low. This finding is analysed in more detail in the
next section.
4. The ECB as a Bundesbank Clone?
It may be inappropriate to estimate a reaction function for the ECB based on an average of
past interest rates of EMU member countries. The ECB is a new institution that has been
specifically designed to conduct a monetary policy different from what most member
countries’ central banks have done in the past. In particular, it has been shaped after the
Deutsche Bundesbank, one of the most stability-oriented central banks in the world. It is
interesting now to ask whether the ECB has been successful in emulating the Bundesbank’s
monetary policy stance.11
Faust et al. (2001) compare the interest rates that would have been set if the Bundesbank were
in charge of EMU monetary policy using a long-run Bundesbank reaction function based on
the approach by Clarida et al. (1998). They find that interest rates actually set by the ECB
tend to be below the projected Bundesbank rates. Evaluating various arguments that may
explain this consistent deviation, they find that none is able to explain the gap between actual
ECB interest rates and projected Bundesbank rates. Hence, in their view, the ECB has, at least
so far, performed a relatively more expansionary monetary policy than the Bundesbank would
have done.
We analyse the claim by Faust et al. (2001) in our framework. Keeping the output gap and
inflation equations restricted to their pre-EMU specification, we implement the German long-
run reaction function based on the estimates of table 3 as the interest rate function in the
system.
EUIntG = 0.49 EUGap + 2.89 EUInfl + 4.02 (3)
The interest rate series consists of German rates until the start of EMU and ECB rates
afterwards (EUIntG). Figure 5 compares one-step ahead forecasts with actual interest rates.
Figure 5: Comparing Bundesbank-based projected interest rates with actual ECB rates
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We also observe after the establishment of EMU that our projected Bundesbank interest rates
are consistently higher than actual ECB interest rates. This confirms the finding by Faust et al.
(2001). As indicated above, this outcome is also apparent from figure 4, which displays the
long-run interest rate target for the estimated ECB reaction function based on past average12
interest rates. So even using an interest rate function based on average EMU member country
interest rates we come to the same conclusion.
However, this outcome is not a direct consequence of the actual transferral of monetary policy
to the ECB, as we obtain a very similar gap for the period 1996:1 to 1998:4. Hence, already in
the run-up to EMU the Bundesbank departed from its long-run interest rate targets. If we
accept that the ECB sets lower interest rates than those based on the German reaction
function, then this is already part of the convergence process prior to EMU. In other words, no
major structural change occurred after the hand-over of national monetary policy autonomy to
the ECB. The transition is remarkably smooth.
On the other hand, it may be premature to accept the conclusion of a “softer” ECB based on a
simple comparison of data points and projections. The projections are subject to uncertainty,
which needs to be taken into account. Within our set-up, out-of-sample forecasting tests of the
long-run reaction function can be used to assess whether the ECB interest rates are
significantly lower than the projected Bundesbank rates. The confidence intervals in figure 5
around the one-step ahead forecasts indicate that the statistical uncertainty does not allow to
discriminate between expected interest rates based on the Bundesbank reaction function and
observed rates.
Finally, we compare our estimated long-run reaction function for Germany as a proxy for the
ECB reaction function with a recent estimate by Faust et al. (2001), who use the same
procedure as Clarida et al. (1998). Apparently, our estimated interest rate series in Figure 6 is
in comparison much more volatile.
Figure 6: Comparison of long-run target interest rates with actual rates
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Clarida long-run target rate  
EUINTG long-run target rate 
 
Notes: The actual interest rate series is the German short-term interest rate until the start of EMU and the official
ECB money market rate afterwards.13
Further, our estimate is clearly superior in the earlier part of the sample period, while over the
period 1995-1998, the other rule is closer to the actual interest rate series. However, at the end
of the sample, the Clarida et al. (1998) rule fails to capture the rise in rates appropriately,
while the our reaction function estimate performs clearly superior.
6
Why is that the case? First, the Faust et al. and Clarida et al. estimates use higher frequency
data. Given the non-availability of GDP data at monthly frequency, the authors had to resort
to industrial production values. Second, their estimate is based on expected inflation as a
variable in the short-run reaction function. Third, they rely on single-equation estimates.
Fourth, the sample period slightly differs.
Checking the potential impact of these differences, we find the following: Results are
somewhat sensitive to the estimation period, but we remain unable to replicate the Clarida et
al. estimates. Estimating our reaction function in a single-equation context tends to widen the
difference to the Clarida et al. estimates (the single-equation long-run estimate using German
data is: GInt = 4.54 + 0.71 GGap + 2.65 GInfl). The way expected inflation rates are
calculated is also an unlikely candidate for generating these differences. This leaves the use of
industrial production and of monthly values as the most likely candidate for an explanation of
the differences. Since the ECB ought to focus on overall GDP and not only on (volatile)
industrial production, this raises doubts about the usefulness of the Clarida et al. specification
for monetary policy. Moreover, higher frequency data do not have any obvious advantages
with regard to long-run target values.
5. Conclusions
This paper provides new results on how monetary policy is transmitted in the three main
EMU member countries, whether there was a notable structural break in response to the new
monetary regime, and how actual ECB interest rate policy compares with interest rate
projections based on estimated reaction functions for the euro area and for the Bundesbank.
The underlying econometric model is quite powerful. The nine equation simultaneous
equation system allows for a structural interpretation, but still passes standard diagnostic tests.
The transition towards EMU is modelled as a change in the policy reaction function while
keeping the remaining economic structure constant.
                                               
6 Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) also provide estimates of a European Taylor rule using only data for the 1990s.
The long-run form of their estimate is: EUInt = 1.58 EUInf + 0.45 EUGap + 2.4. This equation fits very well
during the first year of EMU, but less well over the run-up to EMU. Moreover, it fails to capture the rise in
interest rates in the year 2000.14
We arrive at the following conclusions: First, regarding policy transmission, we found that an
ECB monetary policy shock affects the German output gap most strongly, followed by Italy
and France. The differences between Germany and Italy compared to France are statistically
significant. Hence, we find asymmetric monetary policy effects over the short- and medium
run. The differences are no longer significant over the long-run. European aggregate values
also show the well-known hump-shaped responses to contractionary monetary policy shocks.
The largest negative impact on the European output gap occurs after less than one and a half
years. European Inflation is lagging behind by one period and is much more persistent than
output.
Second, out-of-sample tests for structural stability suggest that in general the transmission
mechanisms in Europe did not experience a structural break before or after the establishment
of EMU. We explain this result by showing that the transition from the Bundesbank regime to
the ECB was not accompanied by a structural break in the monetary regime. We do find,
however, a break in the Italian output equation, which starts to significantly under-predict
output gaps. This suggests that Italy’s nominal and fiscal convergence prior to EMU resulted
in non-trivial and lasting real output costs.
Third, comparing actual ECB interest rate policy with projections based on the European data
and estimated Bundesbank reaction functions, we find the following: Using short-run
estimates of reaction functions, ECB interest setting can be predicted quite accurately. This
result, though, is more due to the high persistence of interest rates than to the explanatory
power of the output gap and inflation rate. In our view, it is more informative to compare the
long-run target values with actual ECB interest rates. During the early phase of EMU, ECB
rates have been consistently below the long-run target rates derived from a Bundesbank
reaction function. This gap emerged already three years before EMU was formed. It is not
directly linked to the hand-over of monetary policy to the ECB. It might reflect some co-
ordination of monetary policies between member countries before the official start of EMU.
On the other hand, the conclusion derived from the perceived differences between ECB rates
and projected long-run interest rates based on a Bundesbank reaction function, namely that
the ECB is “softer” than the Bundesbank, may be premature. When calculating the long-run
values, it is not taken into account that the statistical uncertainty associated with these
estimates is much higher than for the underlying short-run estimates. Evaluating long-run
standard errors indicates that the observed gap between these two interest rates is statistically
not significant. Hence, more observations are needed to answer this question. This must be
left  for future research.15
Appendix
Table A: Diagnostics of the system
AR(2)-test Normality Chow1-test Chow2-test
Vector statistics F(162,276)=1.23 Chi
2(18)=22.08 F(72,58)=1.51 F(72,58)=1.22
Notes: * and ** indicate statistical significance at a level of 5% and 1%, respectively. AR(2)-test is an LM-test
for serial correlation containing two lags. Chow1-test is the standard Chow-test. Chow2-test takes parameter
uncertainty into account.
Table B: FIML-system: Output gap equations
France Coeff. S.E. Germany Coeff. S.E. Italy Coeff. S.E.
FIntt-1 0.04 0.048 GIntt-1 -0.38
(*)
0.206 IIntt-1 0.01 0.055
FIntt-2 -0.14
*
0.064 GIntt-2 0.48 0.299 IIntt-2 -0.07 0.066
FIntt-3 0.1 0.064 GIntt-3 -0.17 0.258 IIntt-3 0.02 0.066







0.232 FGapt-1 -0.003 0.117
FGapt-2 0.13 0.114 FGapt-2 0.42
(*)
0.215 FGapt-2 0.12 0.116
GGapt-1 0.001 0.060 GGapt-1 0.54
**
0.116 GGapt-1 0.08 0.059
GGapt-2 -0.14
*





0.121 IGapt-1 0.26 0.230 IGapt-1 0.46
**
0.126
IGapt-2 -0.11 0.114 IGapt-2 -0.55
*
0.219 IGapt-2 0.01 0.114
FEMUt-2 -34.4
**





8.029 GEMUt-3 -16.6 13.04 IEMUt-3 21.7
**
7.490
FROWt-2 -8.22 11.82 GROWt-2 22.0 13.27 IROWt-2 19.7
*
7.875






s 0.430 0.797 0.474
Notes: (*), *, ** indicate statistical significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table C: FIML-system: Inflation rate equations 
7


































s 0.296 0.573 0.487
Notes: (*), *, ** indicate statistical significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
                                               
7 Several impulse dummies in the French inflation equation capture outliers. The French Franc was devalued
against the DM on 5 October 1981 by 8.8%, 14 June 1982 by 10.6%, and 12 January 1987 by 3%. In the case of
Germany, we need one dummy to capture the reunification. The inclusion of oil prices in the inflation equations
in order to account for import price shocks did not change this picture. The corresponding  results are omitted for
the sake of parsimony of our model.16
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